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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
must be indicated in such a manner as to provoke inquiry among
those persons affected thereby. A number of our statutes comply
with these requisites, but are of woeful composition-redundant
and repetitious, laboriously lengthy, and of Such complexity as to
approach the unintelligible. The modern tradition in drafting
statute titles calls for simple, direct language containing a short,
concise statement of the object. As has been shown above, there
is no constitutional objection in Louisiana to the direct, concise
title. Such a title is commendable because of its undeniable worth
to the bar, to the bench, and to the laity.
B. NEWTON HARGIS*
THE SHORT FORM INDICTMENT ,
HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
The common law indictment was, and is, in those jurisdictions
still using it, a mass of verbose and technical allegations. An ac-
cumulation of "to wits," "then and theres," and "aforesaids" has
not served to expedite the administration of justice. An accused
may be convicted of the offense charged after a full and fair trial
upon the merits, and then have the judgment reversed because
of a technically insufficient or defective allegation.'
The complex and technical form of the indictment served a
very useful purpose during the period when the rules of criminal
procedure were formulated. In the time of Blackstone there were
one hundred and sixty capital offenses.' Consequently, many
judges were very zealous in searching out and discovering tech-
nical insufficiencies in order to prevent injustice in cases where
the punishment was grossly excessive in light of the offense com-
mitted.3 The prosecutors of that period, to combat this judicial
leniency, attempted to formulate indictments which would be
unimpeachable. Naturally the charge became highly technical
and involved. Another substantial argument for the long form
indictment was that the accused was furnished as a basis for his
defense only what he could gather from a reading of the indict-
ment to him at the arraignment. He could neither see the indict-
ment nor receive a copy of it.4
* Associate editor, Louis4ana Law Reiew, 1943-1944.
1. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (1766-1769) 18.
2. Chitty, Criminal Law (3 ed. 1836) 114.
8. Perkins, Short Indictments and Informations (1929) 15 A.B.A.J. 292.
4. 1 Chitty, op. cit. supra note 2, at 403.
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Today, the penalties for lesser crimes have been appropri-
ately reduced, and only a few capital crimes remain., Also, the
accused gets a copy of the indictment. While the practical con-
siderations which gave rise to the intricate and cumbersome
common law form of indictment had disappeared, a number of
jurisdictions continued to employ it.6 "In this day and generation
a community which fondly attempts to protect itself against crime
by such methods is like a child playing with its toy soldiers. ' '7
Use of the long form indictment has often led to ludicrous
results. Cases abound where a*preponderance of evidence and
proof as to the defendant's guilt has been washed aside by a
,stream of astutely manipulated technicalities. In a Delaware
prosecution, a conviction of stealing a pair of shoes was reversed
because the proof established the larceny of two shoes both for
the right foot and hence not a pair.8 A West Virginia court va-
cated a verdict of guilty because the indictment concluded "against
the peace and dignity of the State of W. Virginia," being of the
opinion that the word West should have been written in full.9
Realizing the need for a form of criminal pleading that would
remove occasions for such absurdities and at the same time guar-
antee the accused his rights, the Louisiana legislature, in adopt-
ing a modern code of criminal procedure in 1928, authorized short
form indictments.10 Article 235 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure provides forms of indictment whereby it is sufficient
to charge the offense by its statutory name. There is no requisite
for furnishing particulars of the crime in the indictment. If the
accused desires details regarding the offense, he may call for a
bill of particulars prior to arraignment." For instance, if the
crime is murder, it is sufficient to charge that "A. B. murdered C.
D." If "A. B." wants information as to the means of the homicide
5. Louisiana's capital crimes are: Murder-Art. 30, La. Crim. Code of 1942
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) Art. 740-301; Aggravated Rape-Art. 42, La. Crim.
Code of 1942 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) Art. 740-42]; Treason-Art. 113, La.
Crim. Code of 1942 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) Art. 740-113].
6. Perkins, supra note 3, at 293. Even England, where the long from
originated, remedied the situation somewhat by the English Indictment Act
of 1915.
7. Note (1911) 1 J. Crim. L. 783.
8. State v. Harris, 3 Har. 559 (Del. 1841).
9. Lemons v. State, 4 W. Va. 755 (1870). For a full discussion and collec-
tion of these cases, see Perkins, supra note 3.
10. La. Act 2 of 1928 (La. Code. of Crim. Proc. of 1928). The American
Law Institute saw fit to adopt the short form at its annual meeting, May
8-10, 1930. See American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, Official
Draft (1930) 69-70, §§ 152, 154.
11. Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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and further details, he secures the same through a bill of particu-
lars. The Louisiana legislature amended Article 235 in 1944 by
adding the provision that "in all cases of crimes included in the
Criminal Code, but not covered by the short forms hereinabove
set forth, it shall be sufficient to charge the defendant by using
the name and article number of the offense committed."12 This
amendment has substantially enlarged the scope of Article 235
and all offenses set out in the Criminal Code may now be charged
by the short form. The short form of indictment, as can be readily
seen, provides a much needed sedative for the nightmares of ver-
bose allegations that have harassed district attorneys in the past.
At the same time it minimizes the opportunities of adjudged of-
fenders to escape through the loophole of a technically insufficient
indictment. Defense lawyers have not been so happy about the
important simplification of indictment forms, and have frequently
attacked the sufficiency of short form indictments on the ground
that they violated the accused's constitutional right13 to be in-
formed of the nature of the charge made against him.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has had occasion to consider
the constitutionality of Article 235 in numerous cases and has
uniformly upheld the short form. 4 In State v. White15 the court
upheld a short form indictment for murder. Justice Land de-
clared that, "as 'murder' is a word of universal and common
meaning, no citizen of average intelligence could fail to under-
stand the significance of a charge of murder preferred against
him."' " In State v. Capaci-7 the court overruled defendant's con-
tention that since Article 235 permitted the omission of the words
"malice aforethought" in a murder charge, it changed the sub-
stantive law and was therefore unconstitutional. The court de-
clared that Article 235 dealt exclusively with pleading and did
not purport to affect the substantive law definition of murder.
In another Louisiana case an indictment for perjury, challenged
12. La. Act 223 of 1944.
13. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV; U. S. Const. Amend. VI.
14. State v. Matthews, 189 La. 166, 179 So. 69 (1938)
15. 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931), citing State v. Abeny, 168 La. 1135, 123
So. 807 (1929) and State v. Miller, 170 La. 51, 127 So. 361 (1930).
16. 172 La. 1045, 1047, 136 So. 47 (1931).
17. 179 La. 462, 154 So. 419 (1934). The defendant contended that since
"malice aforethought" is an essential ingredient of the crime of murder,
and that there can be no murder without "malice aforethought" the short
form of indictment for murder has changed the substantive law, in that it
omits to charge that the homicide was committed with "malice aforethought";
and that therefore, Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, is unconstitu-
tional per se. See Note (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 307. See also State v. Bussa,
176 La. 87. 104, 145 So. 276, 282 (1932).
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as not charging a crime, was held to conform to Article 235 and
was therefore sufficient.18 The omission in a larceny indictment
of the name of the owner of money alleged to have been stolen,
was not fatally defective, where such information was supplied
by a bill of particulars. The court declared that the indictment,
supplemented by the bill of particulars, fully complied with the
constitutional requirement that the accused shall be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.19 In a prose-
cution for forgery under the short form indictment containing ad-
ditional words "with' the felonious intent thereby to defraud,
contrary, etc." the indictment was sufficient. The quoted words
were evidently treated as surplusage under the provisions of
Article 240 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.20 Like-
wise, the words "wilfully and feloniously" in a short form mur-
der charge were held to be unnecessary and were treated as sur-
plusage.21 Of course the indictment must contain the allegations
required by Article 235. Where a bill of particulars is requested,
though it is within the discretion of the judge to refuse, he cannot
arbitrarily do so. Abusal of this discretionary power is reversible
error. To assure the defendant of his constitutional rights where
short forms are employed, the provision of the article authorizing
a bill of particulars should be liberally interpreted.
2
Louisiana's progressive and farsighted action in adopting this
simplified method of criminal pleading is not an isolated instance.
A number of other jurisdictions have enacted similar legislation,
and at least one state has adopted the short form by court rule.2 3
The constitutionality of the short form has similarly been upheld
in these other jurisdictions.
18. State v. Abeny, 168 La. 1135, 123 So. 807 (1929). The accused did not
even challenge the constitutionality of the form.
19. State v. Miller, .170 La. 51, 54, 127 So. 361, 362 (1930). Indictment was
in short form, and the court said that "if any defect existed in the charge
as returned and filed, that defect was cured at the request of defendant
himself."
20. State v. Ducre, 173 La. 438, 137 So. 745 (1931).
21. State v. Capaci, 179 La. 462, 154 So. 419 (1934). But see State v. Pin-
sonat, 188 La. 334; 177 So. 67 (1937). However, by the express provisions of
the 1944 amendment to Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, additional
allegations in the short form indictment, inserted to avoid the delays inci-
dental to a bill of particulars, will not vitiate the indictment.
22. State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931). In State v. Ezell, 189 La.
151, 179 So. 64 (1938), the court declared that the trial judge's refusal of a bill
of particulars will only be ground for reversal where there is "manifest
error."
23. New Mexico Trial Court Rules, 35-4446 (became effective July 1, 1934)
[N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 42-641].
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In New York, in the leading case of People v. Bogdanoff,24 the
indictment charged "murder in the first degree contrary to Penal
Law, section 1044.1 25 The court, although indicating a possible
insufficiency in some other cases, held the indictment constitu-
tional.2 6 A later New York case, citing and discussing People v.
Bogdanoff, held that so long as the form did not preclude defend-
ant from asserting in some manner every substantial right he had,
it was adequate. 2
1
In a prosecution for murder in New Mexico, which by court
rule has authorized the short form,2 8 the court cited People v.
Bogdanoff to substantiate its statement that the short indictment
with provision for a bill of particulars, gave defendant all his
constitutional rights.29 To the argument of defendant that the
new form created confusion and did not inform the accused, the
court replied, "If the short form be denominated chaos and the
old archaic form law, then we prefer to divorce the law and take
chaos to spouse."2 0  Two Louisiana decisions holding the short
24. 254 N.Y. 17, 171 N.E. 890 (1930).
25. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. (1939) § 295-d.
26. The court said: "It is sufficient here; it might prove insufficient in
any case where doubt as to its meaning could exist." There was also a vigor-
ous dissent. People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 17, 32, 171 N.E. 890, 896 (1930).
27. People ex rel. Todak v. Hunt, 275 N.Y. Supp. 115, 118, 153 Misc. 783
(1934). "While the court [in the Bogdanoff case] seems disposed to disapprove
of the use of the so-called simplified indictment, if I read correctly the
opinion, it holds that the essential of an indictment within the meaning of
the Constitution (article 1, § 6) is simply 'that a written accusation of a crime
must be presented by the grand jury before an accused may be held for trial
upon a charge of felony;' that, if the indictment fills only this requirement,
the court has jurisdiction, and the details of time, place, and manner of the
commission of the crime may be supplied by a bill of particulars. It may be
that extraneous evidence may be necessary to show which of several crimes
was intended by the grand jury, but the accused should not be heard to com-
plain that a constitutional right has been infringed by the form of an indict-
ment if that form does not preclude the accused from asserting in some
manner every substantial right he may have." The defendant in the Bogdanoff
case made the argument that at times the accused might not choose to
request a bill of particulars and that then the record would not show the spe-
cific crime for which the defendant had been indicted. The court, answering,
said that that might be true, but a voluntary failure to assert a right provided
by statute constitutes a weak foundation for a claim that the statute deprives
the accused of a constitutional right..
28. New Mexico Trial Court Rules, 35-4446 [N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §
42-641].
29. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 413, 60 P.(2d) 646, 655 (1936): "In New
Mexico we have provided a simple means of indictment and information
by which, and within the Constitution, an accusation can be presented against
an accused which sufficiently identifies the charge against the accused, so
that his conviction or acquittal may prevent a subsequent charge for the
same offense; notify the accused of the nature and character of the crime
charged against him to the end he may prepare his defense; and enable the
court upon c6nviction to pronounce judgment according to the right of the
case."
30. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 414, 60 P.(2d) 646, 656.
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form indictment constitutional were also cited with approval. 1
Other decisions of the New Mexico Supreme Court give further
judicial approval to the short form.32
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which has adopted the
short form indictment,33 held it constitutional, in a prosecution
for robbery.3 4 Regarding its use in a conspiracy charge this same
court stated that it could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that
it was unconstitutional.
3 5
Where the short form was employed in an indictment for as-
sault, with the added words "and threatened him," the Ohio
court held the charge sufficient and the additional words mere
surplusage."6 In doing so the court followed Louisiana's view. In
another Ohio case, where this form was used, the accused did not
even question its constitutionality;3 7 and other cases in that state
discuss it with approval. 8
Iowa adopted the short form indictment in 1929,9° and the
courts of that state have found no reason to declare it unconsti-
tutional. It was there stated that the short form, together with
the provision for bill of particulars, is not subject to the criticism
that the constitution has been violated. In a subsequent opinion
the Iowa court similarly held that short form fully protects all
the rights guaranteed the accused under the constitution.4 1 The
Iowa codal section containing the short forms has been cited with
apparent approval by the court in other instances.
In one Utah decision the short form, due to the special cir-
cumstances of the case, proved inadequate.43  The charge was
31. State v. Capaci, 179 La. 462, 154 So. 419 (1934); State v. Engler, 217
Iowa 138, 251 N.W. 88 (1933).
32. State v. Puckett, 39 N.M. 511, 50 P.(2d) 964 (1935); State v. Bogart, 41
N.M. 1, 62 P.(2d) 1149 (1936).
33. R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) § 3, cl. 5.
34. State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500, 190 Atl. 854 (1937). "Our decision is
that the form for robbery allowed by Public Laws 1932, c. 1954, sec. 1, cl. 5,
which was used in the indictment in the case at bar does not violate Article
1, sec. 10 of the Constitution of Rhode Island."
35. State v. Smith, 56 R.I. 168, 184 Atl. 494 (1936).
36. Ohio v. James Meteff, 14 0.0. 3, 6 ' O.Su. 312 (1938). "Said counts
are sufficient in law." The short form became effective in Ohio; on -July 21,
1929 [Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (1939) § 13437-6].
37. Ippolito v. State, 37 0. App. 571, 174 N.E. 798 (1930).
38. Ohio v. Whitemore, 126 O.St. 381, 185 N.E. 547 (1933); Pierpont v. Ohio,
49 0. App. 77, 2 0.0. 240, 195 N.E. 264 (1934).
39. Became effective July 4, 1929. Iowa Code (1939) § 13732.33.
40. State v. Henderson, 215 Iowa 276, 243 N.W. 289 (1932). /
41. State v. Engler, 217 Iowa 138, 251 N.W. 88 (1933).
42. Iowa v. Solberg, 214 Iowa 333, 242 N.W. 84 (1932); Iowa v. Long, 215
Iowa 494, 245 N.W. 726 (1932).
43. State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 117 P.(2d) 455 (1941), on rehearing, 101
Utah 287, 121 P.(2d) 912 (1942).
1944]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
simply perjury without stating the degree of the offense. The
court in quashing the indictment said that no crime was charged,
and that the forms under the statute" would not be sufficient un-
less they were modified to include the degree of the crime
charged.45 The difficulty arose out of the facts that the short form
was adopted by Utah in 1935,48 and the statute dividing perjury
into degrees was not enacted until 1937. 47 Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that with an amendment to the form of indictment for
perjury, so as to state the degree of the offense charged, it will be
upheld. The leading case in Utah, State v. Hill,48 declares the
short form constitutional. The court stated that the adjudications
of all states having similar statutes and constitutional provisions
were examined, and that in none of these was the short form
held unconstitutional. 49 Furthermore, two Utah decisions, subse-
quent to the case first mentioned, cite and discuss the short form
provisions with approval.5 0 Thus the preponderance of Utah juris-
prudence is clearly in favor of constitutionality.5 '
The court§ of Michigan, still another jurisdiction having the
short form, have never held it unconstitutional, nor does it appear
to have even been seriously challenged.5 2 North Dakota, follow-
ing the lead of the other states, enacted the short form indictment
in 1939, 53 and Arizona adopted it by rule of court in 1940. 54 These
states probably examined the jurisprudence in other states hav-
ing the short form indictment very carefully and were satisfied
of the constitutionality and reasonableness of this modem form
of criminal pleading before they adopted it.
A number of states have statutes substantially the same as
the short form, and these have been cited by the courts of the
44. Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) 105-21-47.
45. State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 117 P.(2d) 455 (1941).
46. Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 105-21-47, as amended by Laws of Utah
(1935) c. 118.
47. Laws of Utah (1937) c. 134.
48. 100 Utah 456, 116 P.(2d) 392 (1941).
49. State v. Hill, 100 Utah 456, 458, 116 P.(2d) 392, 393.
50. State v. Avery, 102 Utah 33, 125 P.(2d) 803 (1942); Utah v. Robbins,
102 Utah 126, 127 P.(2d) 1042 (1942).
51. As already noted the quashing of the short form indictment in State
v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 117 P.(2d) 455 (1941), was pivoted upon a legislative
enactment which came subsequent to the adoption of the short form indict-
ment.
52. People v. Kaplan, 256 Mich. 37, 239 N.W. 349 (1931); People v. Gibbons,
260 Mich. 96, 244 N.W. 244 (1932); People v. Ept, 299 Mich. 324, 300 N.W. 105
(1941).
53. H.B. 301, c. 32, Laws of North Dakota of 1939.
54. Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 186 [Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (1939) §
44-753]. Became effective April 1, 1940 [Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (1939) § 44-2551].
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various aforementioned jurisdictions in substantiating their dec-
larations of its constitutionality."
In 1944 Louisiana extended the use of the short form to all
indictable offenses included in the Criminal Code of 1942. Ex-
tensive jurisprudence establishes the constitutionality of the
forms provided by the 1928 enactment, and there is every reason
to believe, that the 1944 amendment will be similarly construed.
The latter accomplishes the same purpose by the same means.
The accused may get specific details by a bill of particulars just
as he could under the legislation of 1928. The form may be slight-
ly' different, but the substance and purpose remain constant.
ROBERT I. BROUSSARD
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE COVERAGE UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The theory of the workmen's compensation acts is that
industry should bear the loss of workmen and their families
occasioned by injuries and death occurring in the employment.
At first the acts comprehended only accidental injuries. As indus-
try became more complex there developed an active need for the
inclusion of industrial diseases. When the public began to under-
stand and accept the idea of employer liability in the field of
industrial accidents the demand grew for such inclusion. The
demand has been met differently by the respective jurisdictions.
Compensation has been allowed by express legislation in some
states, while in others the courts construe the act to comprehend
occupational diseases. There are yet a considerable number of
states that have made no provision for the coverage of industrial
diseases.
The phrase "injury by accident" was taken from the original
English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897.1 This was at first
interpreted rigidly by the English courts to mean only traumatic
injuries. 2 Since Fenton v. Thorley & Company, Limited,3 how-
ever, the term has been extended by the courts. There compensa-
55. Alabama-Ala. Code (Michie, 1940) tit. 15, § 259; Illinois-Ill. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 716; New Jersey-N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939)
§ 2:188; Texas-Tex. Ann. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1926) art. 409; West Vir-
ginia-W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 6263 et seq.; Wisconsin--Wis. Stat.
(1943) § 355.21 et seq.
1. 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1 (1897).
2. Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd. [1905] 2 K.B. 232.
3. [1903] A.C. 443.
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